costs but argues that a contingent right of this sort is compatible with the idea of a human right to immigrate. Section VIII concludes.
I
Before presenting my argument for a human right to immigrate let me first define the right that I shall argue for. It has five important features. First, it is a moral, rather than a legal, human right. Moral human rights set out what people are morally entitled to.
Legal human rights are those recognized in law. 4 No current legal human rights document includes a human right to immigrate. There may be a case for enacting such a right into law but that case is not made here.
Second, I shall assume an interest account of moral human rights according to which these rights "are grounded in universal interests significant enough to generate duties on the part of others". 5 To prove that there is a moral human right to immigrate I must therefore show that people have significant enough interests in the freedom to immigrate to generate duties on the part of others to uphold this freedom. The duties the right generates include, most obviously, the duty upon states not to prevent people from entering or residing within their territory. However, as I shall argue in section VI, the right may also generate further duties, for instance a duty to create the conditions under which foreigners can be admitted without severe cost.
Third, the human right to immigrate I wish to defend can justify at least some forms of interference by external actors, such as foreign governments and international organizations, against states that violate the right. This point is important since, on 4 For the difference between moral and legal rights see some accounts of human rights, it is part of the very definition of a human right that the right's violation by a state justifies some kind of interference by outsiders. 6 'Interference' may be defined broadly so as to encompass a wide range of measures, from public criticism and diplomatic pressure to military intervention. 7 I will not attempt
to specify precisely what kind of interference is appropriate when the human right to immigrate is violated. Violations can vary in form and degrees. What constitutes an appropriate response will likely depend on the circumstances of the case. All I shall seek to show is that violations of the human right to immigrate can justify at least some forms of interference by external actors.
Fourth, as I have already indicated, the human right to immigrate, like other moral human rights, is a non-absolute right. In this sense it is exactly like other human rights.
Sometimes, for the sake of competing moral values, a human right can justifiably be curtailed. As James Griffin has put it, human rights are "resistant to trade-offs but not too resistant". 8 If the costs of immigration are particularly severe, restrictions might be justified. This point will prove important when we turn to protection arguments in section V, that is, arguments that seek to justify immigration restrictions as a means to protect certain values.
Fifth, the human right to immigrate is a right people have to enter and reside in foreign states as long as they like. It thus includes the right to visit a foreign state for a short period of time, as well as the right to permanently reside there. However the right does 6 For accounts of this sort see Charles Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). 7 Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights, 31-40. In defining interference broadly, Beitz distinguishes his account from Rawls. On Rawls' account it is part of the definition of human rights that they justify "forceful intervention", the plainest example of which is military intervention (Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 80) . This may explain why Rawls' list of human rights is so restricted; missing many of the rights included in the UDHR and other human rights documents (ibid., 65). As Beitz account makes plain, one can accept Rawls' definitional tie between human rights and interference, but arrive at a more conventional list of human rights, if one interprets interference more broadly. not in itself entail a right to citizenship in the state in which one resides. While a strong argument can be made for awarding citizenship to long-term residents it is a further argument to the one made here.
Having offered this description of the human right to immigrate let me emphasize three key claims that the idea encompasses. These are (1) that people have significant interests in the freedom to immigrate, (2) that these interests generate duties upon states to uphold the freedom to immigrate and (3) the violation of those duties to uphold the freedom to immigrate can justify interference by external actors. Let us term these claims, (1) the interest claim, (2) the duty claim and the (3) the interference claim. The purpose of this article is to defend all three claims and thereby defend the idea of a human right to immigrate. We shall start with the interest claim.
II
The human right to immigrate is grounded on interests that already recognized human freedom rights protect. By "human freedom rights" I mean the sorts of rights to basic freedoms that are found in a range of international human rights documents. The While the human right to internal freedom of movement protects our interest in being free to access the full range of existing life options, the protection it provides is insufficient since there are many life options that exist beyond the borders of the state in which we reside. As Joseph Carens notes:
Every reason why one might want to move within a state may also be a reason for moving between states. One might want a job; one might fall in love with someone from another country; one might belong to a religion that has few adherents in one's native state and many in another; one might wish to pursue cultural opportunities that are only available in another land.
9
If human rights are to fully protect our freedom to access the full range of life options then we must have a human right to immigrate to other states.
10
The political interest underlying the human right to immigrate and the human right to internal freedom of movement is the interest people have in enjoying a free and effective political process. Free movement is essential for free political activity since one cannot organize in support of a cause by (say) attending a demonstration if one is prevented from getting there. Moreover, since free movement is a condition for free association -one needs to move in order to meet people -it is also a condition for everything that free association makes possible including political dialogue, conflict resolution and the free exchange of ideas. Finally, free movement is necessary for the collection of reliable information regarding political affairs for unless you can go to the effected areas or have someone one trusts go for you, you cannot find out what is happening there. "
These points support the human right to internal freedom of movement but they equally support a right to international freedom of movement. This is true even if we 9 Carens, "Migration and Morality: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective," 27-28. 10 Note that my argument for a human right to immigrate does not depend on the nature of current immigration policy. As it so happens immigration restrictions routinely prevent people from engaging in the activities referred to above. For instance, people from poor countries are commonly denied tourist visas they need to visit friends and family, attend meetings or participate in religious and cultural activities. (Over a million people, roughly a fifth of all applicants, were denied tourist visas to the US in 2012 (Bureau of Consular Affairs, "NIV Worklad by Visa Category FY-2012", http://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/FY2012NIVWorkloadbyVisaCategory .pdf (Accessed: May 5 2013)). Work visas tend only to go to the highly skilled or those in professions with labor shortages. Even family and spousal visas are subject to conditions that make them difficult to obtain for those that qualify and unobtainable for many separated from those they love (e.g. in the US visas there are no visas for unmarried couples, same-sex couples and divorced parents who seek regular contact with their children). While these facts heighten the practical importance of a human right to immigrate they are not essential to the argument for the right's existence. For the existence of a purported human right does not depend on its current violation. I have shown that the interests that ground the human right to internal freedom of movement also ground a human right to immigrate. Let me add that the latter right can equally be derived from the other human freedom rights I have referred to: rights to freedom of expression, association, religion, occupational choice and the right to marry.
Immigrations restrictions place a bar between citizens and excluded foreigners. They interfere with the freedom of both to decide for themselves with whom they associate, communicate, worship, study or marry. They cut people off from careers they may wish to pursue, religions they may wish to practice, ideas they may wish to explore and people they may wish to pursue relationships with. Immigration restrictions act, in other words, precisely like those internal restrictions on individual liberty that conventional human freedom rights protect us from. Our set of human freedom rights is incomplete without the human right to immigrate. It is relatively straightforward to see that people can have essential interests in accessing attachments that lie beyond an "adequate" range. Consider two examples.
First, imagine a person who believes in a religion that is not represented in her own state and wishes to go abroad in order to practice it. 16 What is a proponent of the "adequate" range view to say to this person? "It is sad that you cannot practice your religion here but there are other religions you could choose. Why not pick one of them instead?" For a religious believer other religions are not genuine alternatives since they lack the primary quality the believer finds in her own religion: the quality of being the true religion. Second, consider those separated from friends and family. There may be a range of other people they can form relationships with but they cannot be expected to view these others as adequate alternatives to those they love. The next section addresses three control arguments: from sovereignty, democracy and self-determination. 25 The two sections following that address protection arguments with a special focus on arguments from distributive justice and culture. Control arguments from sovereignty, democracy and self-determination hold that, on account of these values, states are permitted to exclude foreigners from its territory.
The argument from sovereignty claims that control of immigration policy is an aspect of state sovereignty. 26 The argument from democracy holds that immigration policy must be subject to the democratic control of citizens.
27
The argument from selfdetermination contends that immigration is an important object of self-determination since it is important in shaping a state's character.
28
While these arguments are popular in the immigration literature it is often unclear whether those that make them intend to argue that states are morally permitted to exclude foreigners or that states have a right to decide these matters, free from outside interference. In other words, it is unclear whether these arguments are to be interpreted as objections to the duty claim or the interference claim. These two kinds of objections are quite distinct. It is perfectly possible for a state to have a right to decide whether or not to admit foreigners, free from outside interference and yet have a moral duty to make its decision in a particular way. The duty claim could be true even if the interference claim were false.
29
In fact arguments from sovereignty, democracy and self-determination fail as objections to both the duty claim and the interference claim. 
VI
Having established that control arguments from sovereignty, democracy and selfdetermination fail, let us turn to protection arguments: arguments that seek to justify immigration restrictions as a means to protect certain values. There are many protection arguments; immigration has been said to threaten so many different values. 35 Two prominent arguments however are those from distributive justice and culture. The argument from distributive justice holds that exclusion can be justified to avoid deepening distributive injustice. 36 Unrestricted immigration, it has been claimed, would drive down the wages of the poorest and destroy the social cohesion that sustains support for redistributive policies. 37 The argument from culture holds that exclusion can be justified to protect or preserve a host state's culture. Without immigration restrictions, it is held, host state cultures would be radically altered, if not entirely superseded, by immigrant cultures. 38 The first point to note regarding protection arguments is that they rely on empirical
premises that are open to empirical contestation. It is far from clear, for instance, that immigration does drive down the wages of the poorest citizens. An influential study on the effects of the large influx of Cuban immigrants to Miami, following the Mariel boat lift, found it had virtually no impact on wages or employment in the city. 39 Other studies have arrived at similar results. 40 Nor is it clear that immigration saps support for the welfare state. Canada stands as an example of a country that has sustained both high rates of immigration and high levels of social spending. 41 Europe too may offer a story of how immigration and welfare can be combined. 42 Even, the assumption, underlying most protection arguments, that lifting immigration restrictions would result in a flood of new arrivals, requires closer analysis: a point I shall return to in the next section.
It is not the empirical premises underlying protection arguments that I wish to focus on, however, but the normative conclusion that these costs justify restrictions. That conclusion is too quick. Even if immigration does carry costs it may nevertheless be morally incumbent upon a state to allow people to enter.
In fact, I will argue, social costs can only justify restrictions under two conditions: the costs are particularly severe and there is no acceptable alternative means to address them. Since social costs can only justify immigration restrictions in this restricted range of circumstances, protection arguments offer no objection to the human right to immigrate, defined as a non-absolute right. It can both be the case that people have a non-absolute human right to immigrate and that sometimes, when severe costs are threatened and there is no acceptable alternative means by which they can be addressed, restrictions can be justified. Outside this restricted range of circumstances, immigration restrictions are unjust.
The logic underlying this approach is that when we trade off the freedom to immigrate against other values we must award it the same weight as other basic freedoms, which are already recognized as human rights, when they face trade-offs against the values that immigration is said to threaten. We should award the freedom to immigrate the same weight as freedom of movement, association, expression, religion, occupational and marital choice, since, as we have seen, the same underlying interests are at stake.
That we award these other freedoms significant weight is clear from the fact that we recognize human rights to their enjoyment. In certain cases these freedoms may justifiably be subject to restriction in order to avoid social costs, but such cases arise only when the threatened costs are particularly severe and there is no acceptable alternative means to avoid them. So, for instance, in the case of freedom of expression, it might be permissible to ban a political protest if it threatened to result in rioting but not to avoid some more minor cost, such as temporary traffic disruption or offence to opponent groups. Nor would it be permissible to ban the protest if there was an acceptable alternative means to avoid the riot, such as increased policing.
If we award the freedom to immigrate the same weight as these other freedoms then the same two conditions must apply. If we apply these conditions, however, then a number of justifications for exclusion fail, either because the supposed costs they refer to are not sufficiently severe or because there are better alternative means by which the costs may be addressed. Let me develop each of these points in turn.
To see why many of the supposed costs of immigration do not provide sufficient reason to exclude, take the example of distributive justice. Some of the theorists that make the distributive argument suggest that exclusion can be justified not only when immigration threatens to deprive poor citizens of basic goods such as food and shelter but also when it threatens to harm the interests of those citizens who have enough to satisfy their basic needs but remain poor relative to their richer compatriots. 43 In other words these theorists claim exclusion can be justified not only for the sake of minimal sufficiency but also distributive equality.
This point is important for while exclusion might be justified if immigration threatens to push citizens below some minimal sufficiency threshold, it cannot be justified in order to better realize more ambitious distributive ideals. If we consider comparable trade-offs between distributive justice and other important freedoms, we find that we are unwilling to make any incursions into these freedoms for the sake of further gains in distributive justice once people's basic needs have been fulfilled. Right-wing literature may undermine support for the liberal conception of distributive justice, but this provides no justification for banning its publication. Freedom of marital choice allows wealthy people to marry each other if they so choose (and they often do choose), 43 52 On the other hand people do not always move when they have an economic incentive to do so.
Migration within the EU has historically been low despite sizeable wage inequalities between states. 53 Moreover even when large numbers do migrate, they might return soon after, as many of those that came to the UK after accession have since done. 54 Let us suppose, however, that the empirical premise is true: only a small proportion of those that would want to move to rich states could actually be accommodated. Even then the objection fails, for the idea of a human right to immigrate remains meaningful even if it were true that a large proportion of the world's population could justifiably be excluded from rich states. The idea would remain meaningful since the human right to immigrate entails other duties than the duty to admit and these other duties could be fulfilled even when the duty to admit could not. As Jeremy Waldron notes, it is mistake to think that rights correspond to duties in a one-to-one fashion. Rather rights generate a series of duties, including "background duties" that help to secure the right. David
Miller, who supports this view, expresses it as follows: "in cases where because of scarcity we cannot meet our direct obligation to protect A's right, we can still act on background duties that make it more likely that that right will be fulfilled in time".
55
Thus if there is a shortage of medical resources (say), we may have no duty, at the present moment, to attend to everyone's needs, but we may still have duties to raise production of medical resources, train more doctors or launch an inquiry into the state of health services. In this way, an "individual's right does not simply disappear from view once it has been traded off against the rights of others" but "remains in the picture and must be taken seriously as residual source of other duties and obligations". migration. The empirical evidence points to a "hump-shaped" relationship: better-off, poor states produce more migrants than the poorest states. Were more done to tackle poverty, then, in the short term at least, migratory pressure may actually increase.
Nevertheless in the longer term development should reduce migratory pressure. 57 The
European Union provides evidence of this. The history of free movement within the EU has, on the whole, been a history of low migration despite the persistence of sizeable wage inequalities between member states. Two factors seem relevant in explaining low EU internal migration. First, the fact that the poorer member states such as Spain and
Ireland experienced sizable development. 58 This development came partly because the EU did more than simply lift immigration restrictions, is has also offered its members aid and free trade. 59 Second, quite simply, people generally seem reluctant to migrate. As Joseph Carens notes when he considers the EU case:
Some people love novelty and adventure, but most people are not keen to leave home, family and friends and to move to a place where they don't speak the language and don't know their way about. Most consider doing this only when they think they have a lot to gain. 60 In this section I have argued that the right to immigrate entails background duties to create the circumstances under which exclusion is unnecessary. This point relates closely to the point made in the previous section that states have a duty to avoid conflicts between the freedom to immigrate and other values. There I argued that before a state trades-off the freedom to immigrate for other values they have a duty to try to avoid the necessity of making such a trade-off in the first place. Here I am arguing that even after a state has traded-off the freedom to immigrate for other values it still has a duty to undertake policies that, in time, will allow it to recreate a situation in which such a trade-off is unnecessary. While immigration restrictions might be justified if necessary to avoid severe costs, outside these special circumstances they constitute a violation of our human rights.
VIII
Since even the most progressive states restrict immigration and since it is implausible that all the restrictions they impose are necessary to avoid severe costs, we must conclude that even the most progressive states violate the human right to immigrate.
The fact that the human right to international freedom of movement is so frequently violated should not however make us any more tolerant of its violation. When states prevent us from going where we want to go, associating with whom we wish or speaking our minds to those that care to hear our thoughts, the appropriate reaction is one of indignation. It does not matter whether states prevent us from doing these things by fining us, imprisoning us, deporting us or denying us entry: indignation is the appropriate response since states have no right to interfere in our lives in these ways.
Once we recognize and condemn unjustified immigration restrictions as the human rights violations they constitute, we take the first step in the long process of achieving their removal.
